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Federal Taxation of Admissions to Athletic
Contests of State Universities
JOHN D. BLACK:
The Federal Revenue Act of 1932 Sec. 711 (a) amends the Act
of 1926 Sec. 500 (a) so as to impose "a tax of lc for each ioc or
fraction thereof of the amount paid for admission to any place, including
admissions by season tickets or subscriptions, to be paid by the person for
such admission; except that in case the amount paid for admission is
less than 4oc, no tax shall be imposed."
The Act of 1926 Sec. 500 (b) (i) provides an exemption from
the payment of taxes levied on admissions, the proceeds of which inure
exclusively to the benefit of educational institutions. The Act of 1932
amends this provision Sec. 711 (c) and reads, "The exemption from
tax provided by subdivision (b) (1) shall not be allowed in the case of
admissions to any athletic game or exhibition, the proceeds of which
inure wholly or partly to the benefit of any college or university (in-
cluding any academy of the military or naval forces of the United
States)."
The statute, according to these provisions, makes no exception for
any State school, college, or university, so that the purchaser of an ad-
mission must pay a Federal tax on such admissions to athletic contests
though they be conducted by State educational institutions on their own
property and for their own benefit.
The problem at once arises as to whether or not such a tax is un-
constitutional, first as being a tax which operates to burden an instru-
mentality or agency of the State, and secondly as being a burden on the
officers and employees of the State by placing upon them duties in re-
spect to the administration of Federal laws and the collections of Federal
taxes.
It is valuable as a back ground that we notice the present status of
this Act relative to State educational institutions over the country. Prac-
tically all of these institutions are collecting such tax and paying it over
under protest to the Federal Government; Ohio State University is
doing this.
It is interesting to observe that if the statute under consideration
is declared unconstitutional as applied to State schools, the amount so
paid-in could not be clamed by the institutions themselves, but only by
those individuals who purchased tickets and who paid the tax, upon due
proof of such facts.
The University of Iowa at Iowa City has collected the tax and
impounded it, but the State College at Ames has refused to collect it in
the first instance. The action of these institutions was taken as the result
of an opinion by Neill Garrett, Assistant Attorney General of the State
of Iowa, contained in a letter of September 15, 1932, addressed to the
University of Iowa. The decision in such letter was that the tax was a
burden upon the State in its performance of an essential governmental
function.'
The University of Minnesota at Minneapolis has collected the tax
and impounded it following an opinion of Henry N. Benson, Attorney
General of the State of Minnesota, rendered in a letter of September 23,
1932, addressed to the Comptroller of the University of Minnesota.
The Federal Act was declared unconstitutional because first, it bur-
dened the State in its carrying out a governmental function, and sec-
ondly, it burdened officers of the State with duties in respect to admin-
istering Federal laws and collecting Federal taxes.2
' In the letter Mr. Garrett said, "The question arises at once as to whether or not
the Federal Government has the power to thus burden an agency or instrumentality of the
State Government, such as State colleges and universities which are absolutely State sup-
ported and which are controlled by the legislature of the State and the State Board of
Education, which is a creature of the State law and draws its very life, sustenance and
authority from the provisions of State law.
"We shall not undertake to set out or to review herein the various decisions of
higher courts relative to the principle involved in this matter. It is sufficient to say that a
State College or University is an instrumentality of the State engaged in performing a
strictly governmental function.
"It is suggested that the Federal tax on admissions involved herein is expressly levied
on the 'person paying such admission' so that no burden is imposed upon the state institu-
tion, it being merely a collecting agency. This, however, does not avoid the difficulty nor
answer the question. The courts have held that the Federal government cannot burden,
even to a slight degree, a strictly governmental function of the State government, and that
if such a thing would be permitted, there would be a tendency toward impairment of gov-
ernmental agencies under State control. Also, the charging of admissions to athletic con-
tests is a means employed by the college and university regents and boards, and in the case
of State institutions, by the State, for raising revenue for the purpose of defraying at least
a part of the expense of conducting the physical education programs, and, therefore any
Federal tax imposed upon that means necessarily burdens the States in its conduct of such a
governmental enterprise.
"Hence it seems clear to us that the Federal tax herein referred to is an interference
with and a burden upon a governmental function of the State."
' Mr. Benson's letter reads, "The Supreme Court of this State has held in effect that
the University is a 'Constitutional Corporation' and as such is an agency of the State gov-
ernment to accomplish a State purpose: George v. University, etc., Association, 107 Minn.
424; State ex. rel. Smith v. Reed, 1z5 Minn. 194; State ex. rel. University v. Chase, 17S
Minn. 295. It is our understanding that the athletic games and exhibitions conducted by
the university and participated in by students thereof augment the funds available to the
Board of Regents for the maintenance of the university, and that substantial net profits
accrue from these games and are used for general university purposes.
"Since the University is an agency of the State and is engaged in the performance of
a State function, it follows that the games and exhibitions in question are proper govern-
mental activities of the State. This being established, it follows that within the docrine
of Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 2S7 U.S. sos, and Burnett v. Coronado Oil Co., 28 U.S. 393,
and other decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court therein cited, a tax upon admissions to
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In West Virginia there is a suit now pending in the Federal Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia which will be heard at the
Elkins, June, 1935, Term of Court.
This suit involves the University of West Virginia at Morgantown,
but, because of the peculiar factual situation, such may not serve as a fair
test of the problem before us. During the season following the passage
of this Federal Revenue Act of 1932 the tickets of the university were
itemized as $i.oo for admission and io cents for Federal tax. The
Federal government does not seek to recover for a failure to levy and
collect the tax in the past, nor to compel a levy and collection in futuro,
but brings suit to recover only such amounts as was levied and collected
under the tickets which carried the itemization of the ioc Federal tax.
The Athletic Department segregated the admission and the tax items on
the tickets, but when the proceeds were received, they recorded them
as lump sum proceeds without any corresponding demarcation, and failed
to turn the tax item in to the Federal government. The Department
now prints the tickets at a lump sum price without any itemization of a
Federal tax.
The case does not appear very favorable in so far as the University
of West Virginia is concerned, for even if the court assumes the Federal
act to be unconstitutional upon either of the two grounds which we have
enumerated as being the basis of the discussion at hand, it does not seem
that the State could claim the proceeds as against the Federal govern-
ment.
The tax has been collected for the Federal government. If the
those games and exhibitions is in effect a tax upon a governmental function of the State
and in our opinion, may not lawfully be imposed by the Federal Government.
"Under the terms of the revenue act it is made the duty of every person receiving
payments for admissions subject to this tax to collect the amount thereof from the person
making such payments. Return under oath must be made concerning the taxes so collected
to the collector of the proper district and the moneys so collected paid at the time the
same are due. The commissioner of internal revenue, in accordance with the terms of the
act, has prescribed regulations in respect to keeping daily records of all classes of admis-
sions, and these records shall be available to inspection by the U. S. authorities. In order
to comply with the act and with these regulations a person receiving payment of the
admissions tax must necessarily be subjected to considerable additional responsibility and
trouble in the matter of keeping the records prescribed in the manner required. We think
it is well established by the decisions that the Federal government may not lawfully burden
officers and employees of a state with duties in respect to the admission of the federal
laws and the collection of federal taxes. It is likewise true that the State cannot impose
duties relating to its own governmental functions upon officers or employees of the Federal
government. It occurs to us, therefore, that in attempting to make it the duty of the
State to collect, keep record of, and remit to the Federal government an admission tax
upon games and exhibitions given by a state university which occupies the status of the
University of Minnesota, Congress has exceeded its powers, and that the State cannot thus
be compelled to act as an agency of the Federal government.
"It is therefore our opinion that the tax on admissions as prescribed by the Federal
Act is not applicable to payments made by persons for admission to athletic games and
exhibitions of the Universitv of Minnesota."
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Federal act is unconstitutional as being a burden upon an instrumen-
tality by which the State exercises an essential governmental function,
the Athletic department could not claim the tax so collected as its own.
Such would belong to those individuals who paid the tax, upon their
duly proving such fact, but the contest for the proceeds would always
be between those individuals and the Federal government who was re-
sponsible for the tax and for whom it was collected by the State. The
State might intervene in the litigation to aid in having the act declared
unconstitutional, yet there would still remain the necessity of those indi-
viduals who paid the tax proving they had done so, before the Federal
government would be required to refund the amount to them.
On the other hand if the act was to be declared unconstitutional for
placing duties of enforcing Federal acts upon officers of the State, there
is the fact that there was no express prohibition by the State against their
collecting such tax. A State can consent to its officers performing cer-
tain functions for the Federal government; it seems that the complaint
should come before and not after the duty has been performed to the
knowledge of the State. The contest for the proceeds would likewise
be between the individuals who paid the tax and the Federal government.
It is noticeable that neither any State nor the Federal government
wishes to take the initial step in the litigation, both realizing that the issue
is a close one and neither wishing to be the aggressor unless there are
certain factors involved which lends strength to their side. But when
we observe on the part of the Federal government the enormous, steadily
mounting public debt necessitating the tapping of every available source
of income, while on the part of State institutions their curtailed budgets,
fixed debt, and fall-off in attendance it is seen that the acuteness of the
situation may lead to actual litigation in the near future.
FEDERAL TAXATION AS A BURDEN ON AN AGENCY
OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE STATE.
A. The General Rule and Its Application.
The first decision of the Supreme Court of the United States bear-
ing upon the now established rule of the freedom of instrumentalities,
means, and operations of the Federal and State governments in exer-
cising their governmental functions, from taxation by its co-sovereign,
was rendered by Chief Justice Marshall in the famous case of McCul-
lough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.E. 579 (1819).
The converse of this rule, i.e., that the Federal government cannot
tax the instrumentalities of the State government in carrying out its gov-
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ernmental functions, was established in Collector v. Day, i I Wal. 113,
20 L.E. 122 (870), wherein the court declared that it was not compe-
tent for Congress to impose a tax upon the salary of a judicial officer
of the State. The reasoning in this case was identical to that of the
McCullough case, that of protecting the independence of the two gov-
ernments in their respective fields.
As the rule was applied to different facts in subsequent cases, the
courts early recognized that each extension of immunity to one govern-
ment involved as a correlate, a curtailment of the taxing power of the
other, which power was as essential to the one levying the tax as it
was to the one claiming the immunity. The first clear statement was
made in R. R. Co. v. Peniston, I8 Wal. 5, 21 L.E. 787 (878),
wherein the opinion reads, "It can't be said that every State tax which
remotely affects the efficient exercise of a Federal power is for that reason
alone inhibited by the Constitution. To hold that would be ot deny to
the State all power to tax persons and property. Every tax levied by a
State withdraws from the reach of Federal taxation a portion of the
property from which it is taken, and to that extent diminishes the subject
upon which the Federal tax may be laid. The States are, and they must
ever be, coexistent with the National government. Hence the Federal
Constitution must receive a practical construction. Its limitations and
its implied prohibitions must not be extended so far as to destroy the
necessary powers of the State, or prevent their effective exercise."
We are then able to see the problem in the light of the rule and its
qualification. If the tax of one sovereignty operates directly to burden
an instrumentality of its co-sovereign in its exercise of a governmental
function, such tax is unconstitutional and void. But whether the tax
is or is not a burden must be considered from an angle of practicability
by the courts, with a realization that not every tax which can, in some
indirect manner be shown to burden a State or the Federal government
if one of its functions should be declared void, since an extension of
immunity to one involves a curtailment of power in the other.
However, this issue of practicability in its turn has a qualification.
If the instrumentality is one by which either of the sovereigns exercises
an essential governmental power directly, any tax thereupon is a direct
burden and unconstitutional without regard to the amount of the par-
ticular tax or the extent of the resulting interference. Where the im-
munity exists it is absolute, resting on the entire absence of power to
tax even slightly, because this power to tax involves a potential power to
destroy entirely. McCullough v. Maryland, supra; U.S. v. B. and
0. R. R., 17 Wall 322, 21 L.E. 587 (1872); Johnson v. Maryland,
254 U. S. 51, 41 S.C. i6 (1920); Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S.
501, 42 S.Ct. I7i (1922); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. U. S., 283 U. S.
570, 5i S.Ct. 6oi (I93i).
On the other hand it is apparent that not every person who uses his
property or derives a profit in dealing with a State or the Federal gov-
ernment can claim an immunity from taxation on the theory of being an
instrumentality of that government within the meaning of the rule.
The courts have refused to grant such immunity when there is no direct
burden laid upon a governmental instrumentality, and there is only a
remote, if any, influence upon the exercise of the function of government.
Baltimore Shipping Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375, 25 S.Ct. 50
(1904); Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 32 S.Ct.
499 (1912); Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 S.Ct.
172 (1926); Education Film Co. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, S.Ct. 170
(i93); Burnett v. 1. T. Jergins Trust Go, 288 U. S. 508, 53 S.Ct.
439 (x933); Trinityfarm Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466, 54 S.Ct.
469 (934).
Quoting from Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, supra, "As cases arise
between these two extremes it becomes necessary to draw the line which
separates the activities having some relation to the government, which
are nevertheleess subject to taxation, from those which are immune.
Experience has shown that there is no formula by which the line may be
plotted with precision in advance. But recourse may be had to the
reason upon which the rule rests, and which must be the guiding prin-
ciple to control its operations. Its origin was due to the essential re-
quirement of our Constitutional system that the Federal government
must exercise its authority within the territorial limits of the state; and
it rests on the conviction that each government, in order that it may
administer its affairs within its own sphere, must be left free from
undue influence by the other."
S. Carolinav. U. S., 199 U. S. 437, 26 S.Ct. I10 (1905), added
one further qualification to the general rule which must not be over-
looked. In that case the State of S. Carolina, through its own officers
and agencies, carried on the liquor business. The court held that the
income therefrom was not exempt from the Federal Internal Revenue
Act; that when a State engages in a business of a private nature, such
business is not thereby withdrawn from the taxing power of the Federal
government. This same case was cited with favor in Flint v. The
Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 S.Ct. 342 (1911) wherein the
conclusion was made that it was no part of the essential governmental
functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial
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light, water, and the like; also that "the exemption of State agencies
and instrumentalities from national taxation is limited to those of a
strictly governmental character, and does not extend to those used by
the State in carrying on a business of a private nature. See also Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 54 S.Ct. 725 (1934); Helvering v. Powers,
293 U. S. 214, 55 S.Ct. 171 (934). In these cases the court is con-
cerned as to the.type of function which is being carried on; whether or
not such is an essential governmental function. If it is not then the
activity is not exempt from taxation by the co-sovereign, and the fact
that the medium is an agency or instrumentality of the State or Federal
government is of no importance.
With this general rule in mind it will aid us in our consideration of
this problem, to observe the decisions of the courts in an effort to discover
where this line is drawn which separates the exempt from the non-
exempt. For convenience and clarity the cases have been grouped into
two main sections with subdivisions thereunder; such arrangement mak-
ing possible a comparison of substantially similar situations as well as
aiding us in determining into which factual situation or situations the
circumstances of our case takes us.
The first section is that of taxation upon property where the tax
is levied primarily for the purpose of revenue to the taxing government.
A State cannot tax real property within its borders while owned by the
United States as proprietor, to be used for arsenals, fortifications, court
houses, and the like. Van Brocklin v. Tenn., I 17 U. S. 151, 6 S.Ct.
670 (1886). But a State can tax real property of a railroad corpora-
tion deriving its existence from Federal law, exercising its franchise
under such law, and holding property within the State; and this is so
although the railroad is engaged in service for the United States govern-
ment. Thompson v. U. P. R. ., 19 Wal. 579, 19 L.E. 792 (1869).
In this railroad situation it seems that the State could not however levy
and collect a tax upon the operation of a railroad, since such would be a
direct obstruction to the exercise of Federal powers within the instru-
mentalities rule. R. R. v. Peniston, supra. Again in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Mo., 190 U. S. 412, 23 S.Ct. 730 (1903) it was
held that although the telegraph company was an agent of the Federal
government in performing services for it, as well as for the public gen-
erally, the immunity extended only to its relation with that government
and did not exempt its property from State taxation. A more recent
case along the same lines is that of Susquehanna Power Co. v. Md., 283
U.S. 291, 51 S. Ct. 434 (93). The plaintiff there was a hydro-
electric power company acting under a license from the Federal Power
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Commission. It erected a dam and power plant, and as part of the
project, had acquired lands partly in the river bed and partly on adjoin-
ing uplands, which lands were submerged by the water. The court held
all the land to be subject to a State tax because in the words of the
court, "Where a franchise is granted by the Federal government to a
private corporation to effect some governmental purpose, the property
owned and used by the grantee in the exercise of the privilege, but for
its private business advantage, is subject to state taxation."
When an instrumentality is not engaged primarily in a private busi-
ness, but is an agency solely engaged in performing strictly governmental
functions, than its property is within the rule; this is established in Clal-
lam County v. U. S., 263 U. S. 341, 44 S.Ct. 121 (1923), wherein
it was held that a State cannot tax the property of a liquidating company,
which though performed under her laws, was brought into existence and
operated by the United States, whose property was furnished, whose
stock and bonds were held, and whose assets realized from liquidation
were to be taken over by the United States alone. That the line is
rather fine is indivated in Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., supra,
wherein a tax which was levied by Porto Rico upon certain of the
company's property that acquired a situs within the territory, was upheld
although such property was used exclusively by the owner for carrying
out a contract with the United States. In this latter case the dredging
company stood only in a contractural relations with the Federal govern-
ment, as compared with complete ownership and control of the liqui-
dating company by the Federal government in the Clallam County case.
Though not strictly direct property taxes, the inheritance tax cases
seem to fit more accurately in this section; in U. S. v. Perkins, 163 U. S.
625, x6 S.Ct. 1073 (1896) it was held that such a tax may be levied
by a State upon a bequest to the United States, and in Snyder v. Bett-
man, 190 U. S. 249, 23 S.Ct. 803 (1903), by the United States upon
a bequest to a municipality as a subdivision of the State. The reason
which the court gives for its decision in these two cases was that the tax
was upon the transmission by will or interstate laws, and attached before
the property came into the hands of the municipality or the United
States and consequently was not a direct burden upon them.
The second section deals with taxation upon income where the tax
is levied for revenue purposes; and this section is subdivided to deal first
with income derived from the possession of obligations of the sovereigni-
ties, and secondly, with income which is derived from business activity.
In Pollack v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15
S.Ct. 673 (1895) the court held that Congress is without power to levy
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a tax upon the income derived from municipal bonds though held by a
private enterprise. That the Federal government cannot tax the bonds
themselves which were issued by a State or one of its municipal bodies
under its authority which were held by a private corporation, was decided
in Mercantile Bank v. N. Y., 121 U. S. 138, 7 S.Ct., 826 (1887).
However, the Federal government can tax the profit which an indi-
vidual realized from the resale of State and municipal obligations Willi-
cut v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 51 S.Ct. 125 (193), but cannot impose
a stamp tax upon a bond which a State law requires to be given as a
prerequisite to the right to sell liquor within the State. Almbrosini v.
U. S., 187 U. S. I, 23 S.Ct. 829 (1902). In Plummer v. Coler, 178
U.S. 115, 20 S.Ct. 829 (I9OO) a State inheritance tax is valid although
measured by the value of United States bonds transmitted, and in
Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U. S. 384, 42 S.Ct. 324 (1924) Congress
can tax a transfer by inheritance to the full amount although it includes
State and municipal bonds. State laws taxing stockholders at full value,
shares in National banks, are upheld although the bank owns tax exempt
United States bonds. Van Allen v. 4ccessors, 3 Wal. 573, i8 L.E.
229 (I865); Peoples National Bank v. Board of Equalization, 260
U. S. 702, 43 S.Ct. 98 (1922). So a tax upon deposits was upheld,
though such deposits were invested in U. S. securities, Society for Sav-
ings v. Coite, 6 Wal. 594, 18 L.E. 897 (1867), and upon the same
principle, a tax lawfully imposed upon the exercise of corporate privileges
within the taxing power may be measured by income from the property
of the corporation, although a part of such income is derived from non-
taxable property. Flint v. Stone-Tracey Co., supra. But a tax upon the
privilege of doing a corporate business, measured in part by the amount
of non-taxable interest received, may be adjudged unconstitutional be-
cause of being a tax on such interest, if it be fairly inferable that the
real purpose and effect of the tax was to reach specifically these non-
taxables rather than being only an incidental burden thereon. McCallen
Co. v. Mass. 279 U. S. 620, 49 S.Ct. 432 (1929).
The next division concerns the tax levied upon income derived from
a business activity. A State cannot levy a tax upon the salary of the
Captain of a United States revenue cutter, Dobbins v. Commissioners,
16 Peters 435, 1o L.E. 1022 (1842) ; nor can the Federal government
impose a tax upon the salary of a judicial officer of a State, Collector v.
Day, supra; but the Federal government can tax the income of con-
sulting engineers engaged by a State for work not permanent nor con-
tinuous in character on public works, whose duties are prescribed by con-
tract, and who takes no oath of office and are free to accept other
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concurrent employment. Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, supra. Also
the Federal government can tax the salary of a manager of a city water
works system owned and operated by a city, despite the fact that ap-
proximately 40 per cent of the water was used by the city. Denman v.
Commissioners, 73 Fed. (2) 193 (I934). This latter case follows
S. Carolina v. United States, supra, in holding that when a municipality,
as part of a State, engages in operating a city water works, it is not
engaged in an essential governmental function, and therefore the salaries
of its employees are not exempt, since they are not engaged in perform-
ing essential governmental functions.
A state cannot impose a tax for the privilege of selling gasoline
which is measured by so many cents per gallon of gasoline sold, for the
amount sold to the United States Coast Guard Fleet and to a Veterans'
Hospital. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 48 S.Ct. 45 1
(1928). Also when a motorcycle is sold by the manufacturer to 2,
municipal corporation of a State for use in its public service, the Federal
government cannot levy a tax thereon, although the statute requires the
manufacturer to make returns of their sales and to pay the tax. Indian
Motor Cycle Co. v. U. S., 283 U. S. 570, 51 S.Ct. 6oI (1931).
The recent reversal by the Supreme Court on the question of the
taxability of income derived from patents and copyrights granted by the
Federal government is interesting. Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S.
142, 48 S.Ct. 463 (1928) held that such income was subject to taxation
by the State of Massachusetts. The decision was criticized severely on
the grounds that the property in the patents belonged to individuals, and
not to the Federal government, and a non-discriminating tax upon such
income would not impair the efficiency of the Federal government in
the exercise of its function of protecting science and useful arts. So in
Fox Film Co. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 52 S.Ct. 546 (1932) the
court reversed its position and held such income to be subject to State
taxation.
Looking next to the corporations themselves, we find that a State
cannot levy a tax upon the operations of a bank organized under a Fed-
eral banking act. McCullough v. Md. supra; Osborne v. U. S., 9
Wheat. 738, 6 L.E. 204 (1824). Also a State has no power to im-
pose a tax upon a franchise granted to a corporation by the United
States; this was decided in California v. Pacific R. R. Co., 127 U. S. I,
8 S.Ct. 1073 (1888) wherein California attempted to tax the franchise
of a railroad company. But a State statute requiring a telegraph com-
pany to pay a tax upon its property within the State, valued at such
proportion of its capital stock as the length of its line within the State
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bears to its total length, deducting a sum equal to the value of its real
estate and machinery subject to local taxation, was valid although no
deduction was allowed for the value of its franchise from the United
States. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. I, 16
S.Ct. 1054 (1896).
When the corporation is privately owned and merely contracts with
the Federal government, rather than existing under an expressly granted
franchise, the corporation is not thereby rendered an essential govern-
mental agency exempt from State taxation. In Baltimore Shipping Co.
v. Baltimore, supra. certain lands held by the United States were con-
veyed to a private corporation for the construction of a dry dock; it was
held that the profits of this corporation were subject to a State tax al-
though the United States had the right to the use forever of the dry
dock at any time for repair of her vessels free of charge for dockage, and
the land if diverted to any other use would revert to the United States.
Likewise a State tax upon premiums paid to a surety company on bonds
of United State government officials given by surety company in com-
pliance with a Federal act was upheld. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md.
v. Penn., 240 U. S. 319, 36 S.Ct. 298 (I916). In the more recent
case of Trinity farm v. Grosjean, supra, decided in March, 1934, a cor-
poration entered into a contract with the Federal government to build
levees on the Mississippi River; the court held that the corporation was
not such a Federal instrumentality as to escape a State tax levied upon
the amount of gasoline used in engines employed in the work.
If a State engages directly by its own officers in a business which is
of a private nature, that business is not thereby withdrawn from the tax-
ing power of the Federal government. S. Carolina v. U. S., supra.
The same principle seems to apply if a municipality engages in a business
of a private nature as in Denman v. Commissioners of Internal Revenue,
supra, where it was held that a waterworks system owned and operated
by a city was not such a State instrumentality as to exempt the salaries of
its employees from Federal taxation. Yet where the Federal govern-
ment leased certain restricted Indian lands to private individuals for the
purpose of working the oil and gas found thereon, it was held that the
State could not interfere with such leases by imposing an occupation or
privilege tax; Choctaw, 0. & Gulf R. R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U. S.
292, 35 S.Ct. 27 (1914); by taxing such leases; Indian Territory
Illuminating Oil Co. v. Okla., 240 U. S. 522, 36 S.Ct. 453 (1916);
by imposing a tax on the gross value of the production of oil and gas less
a royalty interest; Howard v. Okla. Oil Co., 247 U. S. 503 (1918);
or by a tax upon the net income derived by the lessee from the sale of his
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share of gas and oil. Gillespie v. Okla., 257 U. S. 501, 42 S.Ct. i7i
(1922). The same rule seems to apply when oil and gas leases are
executed to private individuals by the State upon portions of public school
land. Coronado Oil Co. v. Burnett, 285 U. S. 393, 52 S.Ct. 443
(932). But where a municipality makes such a lease, it was held in
Burnett v. /1. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U.S. 508, 53 S.Ct. 439 (I933),
that the Federal government could levy a tax upon the net income
derived by the lessee. It can be seen that this group of cases bears very
directly upon the problems before us. These cases will be treated more
fully in a later part of the discussion.
It is evident from all these cases that the line which separates the
exempt from the non-exempt is not clear and well defined, but on the
contrary is vague and uncertain. In the last analysis the question seems
one of degree to be devided by the courts in reference to the facts of the
situation and in view of their previous decisions.
B. The Rule as Applied to the Conducting of Athletic Con-
tests for Fixed Admission by State Colleges and Univer-
sities.
It has become generally recognized that education is one of the
functions of government. As stated in 24 R. C. L. 558, "The primary
purpose of the maintenance of the common school system is the promo-
tion of the general intelligence of the people constituting the body politic,
and thereby to increase the usefulness and efficiency of the citizens in
which the government of society depends." The Federal government
has not generally entered into the field of education; it has been the
States through their constitutions and statutes that have assumed the
public education of their own children. This has been so prevalent that
one is warranted in concluding that it is an essential governmental func-
tion of a State to carry on a system of public education.
But when a State extends its activity beyond the ordinary public
schools into the field of higher education in college and universities, is
she still engaged in an essential governmental function, or is the State
then engaged in a governmental function which is no longer a strictly
governmental function?
The cases' which have arisen have not completely answered this
question. The court in Marland v. U. S. 53 Fed. (2nd) 907 (1931)
makes this statement, "The establishment and maintenance of public
schools, State colleges and universities by the State in conformity with
its constitution and the enactments of its legislature, is an essential gov-
ernmental function." Under the facts of the case, however, it does not
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seem that the leased land was held by the State for a particular college
or university but for school purposes generally. No doubt part of the
receipts did go to State universities and colleges, but under the facts of
the case the statement seems to be only dictum.
Group No. x Oil Co. v. Bass, 38 Fed. (2nd) 68o (1930) involved
lands leased by the State of Texas for the benefit of the University of
Texas. The Federal District Court therein held that the maintenance
by the State of its university was an essential governmental function,
and that the income of the lesee of such land was exempt from Federal
taxation. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals 41 Fed. (2nd) 484
(193o) reversed this decision and held the income of the lessee to be
subject to the Federal tax, but did not decide definitely as to whether
or not the State in maintaining the university was engaged in an essential
governmental function. The Court, however, did not expressly over-
rule the decision of the District Court in this respect, but based its de-
cision of reversal on another ground. From this one might infer that
the court felt that there was sufficient merit as not to warrant its express
overthrowal. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
Court of Appeals without comment upon this issue.
In Coronado Oil Co. v. Burnett, 50 Fed. (2nd) 998 which in-
volved lands leased by the State for the benefit of the common schools,
the Court commented upon the Group No. x Oil Co. case and found
that the only substantial difference between that case and the case at bar
was the existence of the peculiar property law of Texas in that previous
case. The Court did not see any difficulty in holding that a State was
engaged in an essential governmental function in maintaining a univer-
sity. When this case was heard in the Supreme Court, supra, Mr.
Justice Stone wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justices Bran-
deis, Roberts, and Cardozo in which he said in comparing these same
two cases, "The leasing by the National government of Indian oil lands
in Oklahoma to private lessees for the benefit of the Indians, the leasing
by Oklahoma of its school lands in like fashion for the benefit of the
schools of the State, are no more and no less governmental enterprises
than the leasing by Texas of its oil land for th6 benefit of the State
university." The majority opinion had not made an issue of this par-
ticular point.
In the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. U. S. 289
U.S. 48, 53 S. Ct. 509 (933) it was held that the University in
importing scientific apparatus for use in one of its educational depart-
ments was not immune from Federal custom duties. The court said,
"It is for Congress to decide to what extent, if at all, the States and
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their instrumentalities shall be relieved of the payment of duties on
imported artides."
These cases do indicate a tendency toward an acceptance of such
being an essential governmental function and from a practical standpoint
it seems that such a decision would be the correct one. The reason
behind the system of public school education was to promote the general
intelligence of the people and to increase the usefulness of those citizens
on whom the State must depend. At one time the economic, political,
and social conditions of our country may have been understandable,
without advanced education. But conditions have changed, and the
realization is stronger today than ever before, that the complexity of our
civilization demands increased study and specialization in the fields of
higher education if we are to intelligently meet the serious problems of
today with any degree of success. And this intelligence must not be
confined to those individuals who are to be at the helm of government,
but such must also be present at the polls, where the attitude of people
generally toward the issues of the day is made known. For these reasons
it seems that the establishment and maintenance of colleges and univer-
sities by the States is an essential governmental function. As an essen-
tial governmental function the Federal government cannot, under the
rule laid down in McCullough v. Maryland, supra, tax the instrumen-
talities, means, and operations by which the State carries out this function.
Another problem now arises. With the rapid development of the
general field of education, the activities of such institutions have been
extended into many new fields. Many of these activities, although inci-
dental to the performance of the function of education, would seem
more likely to be classified as private business enterprises. For example,
the students of the agricultural department farm upon university land
and market the produce grown thereon; other departments of the uni-
versity conduct plays, debates, concerts, or athletic contests which are
open to the public at fixed admission prices. These activities would be
classified as private business enterprises were it not for the fact that the)
are conducted in connection with the university and its educationa
program.
As these institutions increase their activities, some will tend to be
more remote from a strict educational function. It then becomes neces-
sary to determine whether such activities are exempt from Federal taxa-
tion under the immunity of the institution which is an instrumentality
of the State in the performance of the governmental function of edu-
cation.
Here, the State through the athletic department of the university,
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is conducting an athletic program which is open to the public at a fixed
admission price. Is such activity immune from Federal taxation as being
an instrumentality, means, or operation by which the State exercises its
essential governmental function of education?
At first glance it would seem that the case of S. Carolina v. U. S.,
supra, would control in this situation, and such activity would be tax-
able, for where a State carries on a business of a private nature, such
business is not withdrawn from the taxing power of the Federal govern-
ment. The Court foresaw the danger of the States, under the guise of
regulation, and with a view to a profit, taking possession in a similar
manner of other objects subject to the Federal tax. When there is added
to that the growing movement in favor of ownership and operation by
the public of so-called public utilities, there is a danger of so curtailing
the source of revenue to the Federal government as to seriously hamper
it in its operations. The tax was upheld although the business entered
into was incidental to the exercise of the governmental function of pro-
tecting the public welfare.
However, serious inroads have been made in the holdings of S.
Carolina v. U. S. and of Helvering v. Powers, supra, in situations deal-
ing with leases made by the Federal government of land held for the
benefit of the Indian tribes of the nation, and similar leases made by the
State, of land held for the benefit of State educational institutions. The
cases bear so directly upon the problem before us that a resum6 of these
decisions is vital at this point.
The Federal government owned certain lands, valuable because of
the natural resources found thereon, for the benefit of the Indian tribes.
These lands were leased to private individuals or companies who pro-
duced such resources and sold them on the market, the Indians to
receive as agreed per centage of the ore, or of the gross income, or net
income. The States attempted to tax the gross revenue of the lessee,
Choctaw and Gulf R.R. v. Harrison, supra, the capital stock of corpora-
tions acting as lessees, Indian Oil Co. v. Okla., supra, the gross produc-
tion, Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., supra, the net income of the lessee,
Gillespie v. Okla., supra, and the ores mined and in the bins by an ad
valorem tax, Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 603 (1926); but
every attempt was ruled out as unconstitutional. The Court found in
each of the cases that the agreement with the Indians imposed upon the
United States the duty of exploiting the resources upon the lands, and
that the lessees were the instrumentalities through which that obligation
was being carried into effect.
Similarly, the States held certain lands for the benefit of their edu-
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cational institutions which they leased to private individuals. The two
leading Supreme Court cases involving such leases are Group No. .
Oil Co. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279, 51 S. Ct. 432 (193) and Coronado
Oil Co. v. Burnett, supra. In the Group No. i Oil Co. case the state of
Texas leased certain land, held by the State for the benefit of the Uni-
versity of Texas, to a private company to produce the oil reserves
thereon. A Federal tax levied upon the profits of the lessee after first
deducting the State's royalties was upheld. In the Coronado case, how-
ever, where land held by the State of Oklahoma for the support of cer
tain common schools was leased to a private company with the State
reserving a part of the gross production, a Federal tax levied upon the
income from the lease by the lessee was declared unconstitutional. The
decision in the Group No. x Oil Co. case was principally based upon a
settled property rule in Texas which declares that such a lease passes
title completely out of the State as a present sale; and the property being
no longer that of the State, but of the lessee, the latter could not claim
the immunity of the State. The Coronado case in commenting upon
the Group No. z Oil Co. case noted this peculiarity of the Texas law
in this respect. In following Gillespie v. Oklahoma the Court brought
the school lease cases in line with the Indian lease cases.
The distinction made between the Coronado Oil Co. case and the
Group No. Oil Co. case has been severely criticized as being without
any foundation. The distinction seems extremely narrow if it exists at
all. During the term of the lease the benefit to the State is as far
removed from the State as when the property is conveyed in fee. On
the other hand the burden is as substantial upon the State in its receipt
of income whether it be of rent when a lease is concerned, or of the
royalties when the fee simple is passed. The decision of the Group No. i
Oil Co. case indicates that the Court is seeking to avoid any extension of
the Gillespie case. Under this ruling large private incomes are escaping
Federal and State taxation, where as to tax these same incomes would be
to burden the State or Federal government only remotely and indirectly
if at all, since the tax is upon the lessee's share of income or raw material
after the State has received its agreed proportion. This would seem to
be a wholesome limitation on these lease cases, since it does not effect
directly the share which would go to the State or Federal government.
For another limitation of the Gillespie case see Indian Co. v. Board of
Equalization, 288 U.S. 325, 53 S.Ct. 388 (1933).
The case of Burnett v. A. T. Jergins Trust, supra, is very inter-
esting. There the City of Long Beach, California, leased to a private
company certain oil lands owned by the city which had previously been
LAW JOURNAL-MAY, 1935
used for her water supply. Under the lease the oil and gas were sold by
the parties jointly and the proceeds were divided in agreed proportions
between them. The court upheld a Federal tax upon the receipts of
the lessee. The lessee relied upon Gillespie v. Okla. and the Coronado
case; the court said in commenting upon these cases, "In both of these
cases the sovereign was acting as trustee of an express trust with regard
to the land leased. In both the burden upon the public use was more
definite and direct than in the present case."
It seems then that when a municipality, which is a subdivision of a
state, makes identical leases, the activity of such lessees is subject to Fed-
eral taxation. But had the State made a lease to the same private com-
pany of land which she held for the benefit of her educational institu-
tions, then the business of such lessee would be exempt from Federal
taxation as being an instrumentality by which the State exercised an
essential governmental function. As said in Burnett v. Coronado Oil
Co., "When Oklahoma undertook to lease her public lands for the
benefit of the public schools she exercised a function strictly govern-
mental in character. Consequently S. Carolina v. U. S., much relied
upon, does not apply."
The State then in the interest of her educational institutions can
exploit the natural resources of her school land through private lessees,
and in so doing, such business is immune from Federal taxation, although
it be of a private nature, because it is an instrumentality by which the
State exercises the governmental function of educating its people. It
would follow that the State could operate the same land for the benefit
of such institutions through her own officers, since that would merely
change the instrumentality by which the governmental function would
be performed.
If a State then, in the interest of her educational institution, con-
structs upon school property a stadium, and with the students of such
institution as participants, conducts athletic contests thereon for which
she charges admission, is such activity immune from Federal taxation?
Is not the reasoning of these school land lease cases applicable to the very
problem before us?
The primary interest in both cases is to benefit the educational insti-
tution. In both there is a development of the State's educational land
for the purpose of deriving revenue therefrom to carry on her educa-
tional program which is an essential governmental function; for if edu-
cation is such a function of the State, Marland v. U. S., supra, the




The development of the land in so far as actual details are con-
cerned is admittedly different, yet fundamentally there does not seem
to be any great difference. Should not the State employ the property
which she holds for the benefit of her schools in such a manner as will
result in the maximum of benefit to such institutions? If there are
valuable mineral resources thereon, the State can exploit such resources,
and in so doing, that activity whether carried on by officers of the State
or private lessees, is immune from Federal taxation. The land, however,
may not be valuable for natural resources so the State through the ath-
letic department of the university builds a stadium and conducts athletic
contests therein, for which they charge admission. Instead of the private
lessee there is the athletic department; instead of constructing on such
lands oil wells and other apparatus necessary to produce the oil, there is
built a stadium; instead of the natural resources there are the students
of the institution. On one hand there is the private business of producing
and selling the natural resources, while on the other there is the private
business of carrying on public entertainment. Yet in both there is the
exercise of the governmental function of deriving a revenue by develop-
ing the State's educational land in order that the State could carry on
her educational program. It seems that the activity relative to the con-
ducting of such athletic contests for fixed admissions, should be exempt
from Federal taxation in the same manner and for the same reason as
the activity in relation to the exploitation of the natural resources on
educational land for the benefit of the State's educational institutions.
One argument made is to the effect that the proceeds derived from
the admissions are not applied by the university for the benefit of general
educational purposes, but are disbursed by the athletic department as
such department sees fit. Admitting this to be true, it does not follow
that the funds are not applied to the benefit of the university. An exam-
ination in specific detail of the athletic department noticing its control,
operation, and personnel discloses that this argument is of no force.3
' The physical education plant, with the exception of the gymnasium and the amount
privately donated for the stadium, has been constructed by means of the funds derived
from receipts from the athletic contests. The title to this athletic plant is in the university.
Besides constructing the stadium and natatorium, the department has purchased a site for
a university golf course which is to be maintained for the students.
The coaching staff has faculty ranking. Besides conducting their specific sport, they
also conduct classes in physical education.
The disbursements and the general policies of the department are under the control
of the Athletic Board. This board is composed of eleven men of whom six are appointed
by the President of the University, two by the Student Senate, and two are elected from
the alumni. Through control of majority vote the policies of the department are decided
by the seven men appointed by the President and the Board of Trustees. The Board of
Trustees could, if they desired, cause the entire proceeds derived from the athletic contest
to be turned into the general university fund to be disbursed for general educational pur-
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Another argument is made that the tax is not upon the athletic
department but only upon those individuals who buy the tickets; that
the burden therefore is upon those individuals, and not upon the athletic
department. If not a burden upon the department, it would then be
immaterial as to whether the department was or was not an instrumen-
tality of the State in carrying out an essential governmental function.
Since the student tickets go free of any tax, the tax is not upon the
gross receipts but upon the individual admission. The University fixes
its price for the seat, and the additional tax is borne by the purchaser to
be collected by the University for the Federal government.
Actually, however, the gate receipts are curtailed by such a tax.
The department has the alternative of adding the tax to the existing
admission price and suffering from a consequent dropping off in attend-
ance, which normally results from increased prices of admissions, or
keeping the price intact and receiving a lesser amount from each ticket
sold. To this extent it is a burden on the department.
U. S. v. King County, 281 Fed. 686 (1922) involves a similar
situation. There the Federal government attempted to tax tickets for
transportation on a ferry operated by a county under State laws. The
court said "It is true that in the present case the tax was not imposed
directly upon the county but upon the person paying the transportation
charges; but it is obvious that the collection of those charges is at least
one of the means to which the county must resort to for the purpose of
paying the cost of the ferry, which, if insufficient, must be made good
from the other revenue or by Federal taxation. Hence it seems plain
that the Federal tax here involved is an interference with and a burden
upon the governmental functions of the state."
Furthermore, the Federal tax could be increased to such an extent
as to render the price absolutely prohibitive; although this is not probable,
it would be possible. The decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Mc-
Cullough v. Maryland hinges on this very argument. The tax is unques-
tionably a burden on the department, and not a burden exclusively upon
the individual who purchases the ticket.
It was noted previously that G;llespie v. Oklahoma has been criti-
cized because under its ruling vast private incomes were being given
immunity from State and Federal taxation. The situation under discus-
poses. The stadium at the present time houses some two hundred young men under a
cooperative dormitory plan, thereby making it possible for these men to attend the Uni-
versity who otherwise would be unable to do so because of a lack of financial means. This
work is under the supervision of the University Examiner.
From these facts we see that the Athletic Department is so related to the physical
education program and to the University in general as to be an essential part thereof.
The proceeds of the contests are applied to the benefit of the University.
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sion is not subject to this criticism, because the entire income accrues to
the athletic department to be used for the benefit of the University.
There is lacking that element of a purely private enterprise operated for
the private gain which accrued to the lessees over and above that amount
which went to the State or Federal government in the Indian lease
cases and the school land lease cases.
The maintenance of a university by a State is an essential govern-
mental function. The means, instrumentalities and operations by which
she carries out this function are therefore immune from Federal taxa-
tion. The carrying on of athletic contests through the athletic depart-
ment of the university on school land for the purpose of deriving a reve-
nue to be applied to the benefit of the university is a means by which
the State carries out this essential function of education. As such a
means the activity thereof is immune from taxation. The tax here is a
burden on the means by which the State carries out her function of
education, and is therefore unconstitutional.
This seems the logical conclusion from the decisions rendered by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The decisions of this Court
cannot be predicted with certainty in advance, but it seems that if the
Court is to come to any other conclusion it must necessarily overrule a
long line of cases dealing with leases made by the Federal government
of land held for the benefit of the Indian tribe and leases of land held
by the State for the benefit of her schools. Also the result is desirable
since the entire proceeds inure to the benefit of the university without
the intervention of any private enterprise for a profit, which profit is
escaping Federal or State taxation, an element which has caused the
holding of Gillestie v. Oklahoman, supra, to be severely criticized.
II. THE TAX As IMPOSING DUTIES ON STATE OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES.
The Act imposes upon the Athletic Department the duty of collect-
ing the amount thereof from the person making the payment, of keep-
ing certain prescribed records, of making certain returns under oath,
and of paying in the money so collected when due. It unquestionably
subjects the department to considerable additional work and expense.
Can these duties be constitutionally imposed upon the Department?
In general the State and Federal governments act independently of
each other in carrying out their executive and administrative functions,
and the principle has become established that the Federal government
cannot impose upon officers of the State the imperative duties of execut-
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ing Federal laws, nor can the State impose similar duties upon Federal
officers. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 16 L.E. 717 (i86o).
However, there seems to be no constitutional objection to the granting
of such powers by one sovereign to the officers of the co-sovereign, if the
officers are willing to carry out such duty and their sovereign does not
expressly prohibit such act. It was held in Prigg v. Penna., 16 Pet. 539,
lO L.E. io6o (1842) that in the absence of express prohibition by the
State, the State is presumed to give its consent to the exercise of Federal
functions.
The members of the Athletic Board cannot be classified as officers
of the State. This is a conclusion drawn from State v. Hewitt, 3 S.D.
187, 52 N.W. 875 (1892) wherein it was held that the trustee of a
State agricultural college appointed by the Board of Regents of Educa-
tion was not a "State Officer" within the meaning of the term. They
are, however, employees of the State, and the question arises as to
whether or not these same rules apply to State employees. It is neces-
sary then to find the reason behind the rule.
Kentucky v. Dennison, supra, is the only case where an officer of
the State has refused to carry out a duty imposed upon him by the Fed-
eral government to execute Federal laws. In other instances the duties
have been performed by State officers and acquiesced to by the State.
Thus it has been tipheld that State magistrates can, by act of Congress,
be authorized to arrest fugitive slaves, Prigg v. Penn., supra; that con-
gress can authorize State justices of the peace to issue warrants for the,
arrest of deserting seamen, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 17
S. Ct. 326 (1897) ; that State officials can be used by the Federal gov-
ornment in the exercise by the latter of the power of eminent domain,
U. S. v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 3 S. Ct. 346 (1883); that the United
States can make use of State courts in the granting of naturalization to
aliens, Holmgren v. U. S., 217 U.S. 509, 3 0 S. Ct. 588 (191o); and
that the United States may avail itself of the use of State officials for
the execution of its Selective Draft Laws during war time, Irver v.
U. S. 245 U.S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159 (1918).
In the Selective Draft cases the State officers were performing the
duties imposed upon them with the consent of the States. The complain-
ants were citizens of the State who claimed the Draft Laws to be uncon-
stitutional because of imposing duties upon officers of the State. The
court said "We are of the opinion that the contention that the act is
void is a delegation of Federal power to State officials because of some of
its administrative features is too wanting in merit to require further
notice."
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In Kentucky v. Dennison the opinion reads, "And we think it clear
that the Federal government, under the Constitution, has no power to
impose on a State officer as such, any duty whatever, and compel him
to perform it; for if it possessed the power, it might overload the officer
with duties which would fill up all his time, and disable him from per-
forming his obligations to the State, and might impose upon him duties
of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to which he was
elevated by the State."
The former of these two reasons might be extended to cover em-
ployees of the State as well as officers of the State. The employees have
certain duties which they perform for the State, and to impose Federal
duties upon them would disable them to that extent from performing
their duties for the State.
On the other hand, the courts may hold the ruling of Kentucky v.
Dennison strictly to the facts of that case. It is pointed out in 22 R.C.L.
38I that "an officer is distinguishable from an employee in the greater
importance, dignity, and independence of his position in being required
to take an official oath and perhaps to give an official bond, in the more
enduring tenure, and in the fact that the duties of the position are pre-
scribed by law. Furthermore, a mere employee does not have the duties
or responsibilities of a public officer." The fact that the duties of an
employee are not prescribed by law and the tenure of office not fixed
make an imposition of Federal duties upon him less onerous to the State
than in the imposition of such duties upon a State officer. It may be
that this difference in the degree of the burden upon the State when an
employee of the State is concerned, as compared with the burden when
an officer of the State is concerned, will cause the courts as a matter of
practicability, to allow the Federal government in the execution of its
powers to impose certain duties upon employees of the State.
An examination of the duties imposed upon the Athletic Depart-
ment indicate that they are not so burdensome as to effect it in any
substantial manner in its function of deriving revenues for the benefit
of the university. These duties consist, for the most part, of making
certain bookkeeping entries and keeping specified records, and can be
coordinated into the general operations of the Department without great
difficulty.
It is difficult to predict which of these two approaches the Court
will adopt, and the rule as laid down in Kentucky v. Dennison, supra,
does not lend a great deal of assistance in determining beforehand what
their decision will be. One is impressed by the rarity of dissent on the
part of the State, its officers, and employees despite the rather frequent
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use by the Federal government of these same officers and employees.
With but one exception the States have not seen fit to prohibit the deli-
gated duties, nor have the officers seen fit to refuse to perform the same.
Until the State, through its legislature, prohibits the performance
of these duties, or the Athletic Department refuses to perform them, the
constitutionality of the act in this respect will not be questioned. In the
event of a decree, there will be no relation back, and such decree will
be effective only from the time of the legislative prohibition or the express
refusal by the Department.
